Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2016

We Are What We Tax
Mary Louise Fellows
University of Minnesota Law School, fello001@umn.edu

Grace Heinecke
Linda Sugin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke, and Linda Sugin, We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413
(2016), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/503.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

SYMPOSIUM
WE ARE WHAT WE TAX
FOREWORD
Mary Louise Fellows,* Grace Heinecke** & Linda Sugin***
INTRODUCTION
On November 12 and 13, 2015, the Fordham Law Review hosted a
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax. We invited scholars with a wide
array of expertise inside and outside of the tax arena to consider how tax
laws have shaped public and private institutions, cultural norms and
hierarchies, and societal values. The symposium has two distinct aims.
The first is to explore the effect on the body politic of tax systems that
give reality to things that might not otherwise exist and make invisible that
which is beyond taxation. Academics and policymakers (elected and
nonelected alike) generally have a narrow economic and instrumentalist
conception of tax laws. For them, taxes are a tool at the ready to address
both fiscal and nonfiscal problems. In contrast, this collection of articles
treats tax as a constitutive and a creative component of a nation’s cultures,
values, and institutions.
The far-reaching conception of tax law advanced in this symposium
means that all legal areas of study and all disciplines outside the law have
the potential to provide indispensable insights into a tax system and its
impact on those subject to it. Therefore, the second aim of the symposium
is to include the perspectives of nontax and nonlaw scholars. We asked
each tax scholar to suggest a topic that would address the role tax laws play
in defining, explaining, and forming society. With a tax scholar’s thesis in
hand and in collaboration with that contributor, we identified a nontax
scholar who had an interest in either coauthoring or presenting a paper on a
related topic. The symposium demonstrates that economics, history,
* Everett Fraser Professor of Law, Emerita, University of Minnesota Law School. In
addition to their articles published here, we are grateful to all the symposium participants for
two days of rich, interdisciplinary, and thought-provoking discussion. We also want to thank
the Volume 84 Board of the Fordham Law Review for their unwavering dedication in
preparing the symposium for publication. This foreword provides an overview of the
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax held at Fordham University School of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; Executive Symposia Editor,
Fordham Law Review, Volume 84.
*** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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sociology, and many areas of legal scholarship outside of tax have much to
add to the debates taking place among tax scholars and policymakers.
We hope these contributions prompt tax scholars to engage in more
robust analysis as they consider and reconsider well-known tax approaches
and issues and that nontax scholars begin to appreciate how tax law
implicates their seemingly unrelated fields. The contributors’ reconception
of tax laws as affected by and reflected in a nation’s cultural values and
social institutions challenges traditional approaches that treat taxes as an
overlay on existing economic arrangements.
Their articles most
importantly demonstrate that the premise that We Are What We Tax
fundamentally changes conventional understandings of tax systems and
their significance in the lives of those who live under those tax systems.
We have organized the articles into the following four categories: (1)
how and why tax progressivity gets undermined, (2) how reality gets
translated into a tax system, (3) how tax expenditures realign the functions
of the public and private sectors, and (4) how a self-assessment tax system
has produced a crisis in the legal profession.
This organization
demonstrates the breadth of the topics considered in this symposium as it
enhances understanding of related theses. Significantly, it also reveals how
the articles interconnect with each other through the frequently recurring
themes of economic inequality, fairness, and social justice.
I. HOW AND WHY TAX PROGRESSIVITY GETS UNDERMINED
Contributors Goldburn P. Maynard Jr.1 and Timothy K. Kuhner2 explore
the unremitting sympathy for tax policies promoted on the promise of
economic growth and the relentless opposition to a progressive tax that
holds the promise of restraining inequality. Maynard, relying on cognitive
psychology, explains—in the context of the attacks on the United States’s
wealth transfer taxes—why narratives about the “capable, smart, and
hardworking” entrepreneur, however misleading, “trump science,” “become
entrenched,” and lead to support and defense of the “social status quo,”
including the “dominance of the wealthy in society, irrespective of the
perceiver’s own group membership.”3 Kuhner’s far-reaching discussion of
liberal and social democracies situates progressive taxation measures within
neoliberalism.4 He details how, since the 1970s, “neoliberalism [has]
brought about the ‘“economization” of political life’ for the purpose of
‘capital enhancement.’”5 He looks to campaign finance rules in both
presidential democracies and party finance rules more common to
parliamentary systems of governance to show how “market interests and
1. See generally Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2429 (2016).
2. See generally Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Liberal and Social
Democracies, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2453 (2016).
3. Maynard Jr., supra note 1, at 2448.
4. See generally Kuhner, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 2455–56 (quoting WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S
STEALTH REVOLUTION 17, 22 (2015)).
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ideologies” have hijacked state power and how the neoliberal agenda of
“privatization, deregulation, and physical austerity” has led to high levels of
economic inequality and political disempowerment.6
Symposium contributor Victor Fleischer, investigating the effect of
various tax policies that lower the rate of tax on entrepreneurial income,
considers some of the same issues that Maynard raises.7 Fleischer at the
outset notes the absence of “empirical evidence to support a claim that taxes
have a significant effect on entrepreneurship,” “job creation,” and
“economic growth.”8 He posits that “[e]ntrepreneurship has long been
recognized as a kind of ideology—with both positive and negative
connotations” and that the “prevalence of ideology over evidence is hardly
a new problem.”9 Fleischer goes on to argue that just as policymakers do
not subject “constitutional rights like freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, or democratic governance” to a “cost-benefit analysis,” they
similarly treat “the effect of [low] taxes on entrepreneurship as a matter of
faith, not reason.”10 He warns, however, that “how one thinks about
economic freedom” should not “dictate how one thinks about taxes,”
because it “confuses how we should think about risk, inequality, and merit
in an entrepreneurial economy.”11 He concludes that “[t]he strongest
argument that entrepreneurship holds a special place in our legal system is
one grounded in institutional economics.”12 Fleischer urges policymakers
to shift their focus from low taxes on entrepreneurship to issues of social
mobility and the wider range of institutions necessary to support an
entrepreneurial economy.13 With the tax code put to the side, he ultimately
envisions an “economy that maximizes opportunities.”14
Symposium participants David Clingingsmith and Scott Shane, in
response to Fleischer, directly address the relationship between increases in
individual tax rates for high-income taxpayers and productivity by looking
to the nexus between changes in tax rates and entrepreneurship.15 They
present an extensive review and critique of both U.S. and non-U.S.
empirical studies regarding the effect of changes in individual tax rates on
entrepreneurship.
Clingingsmith and Shane reveal the intractable
theoretical and practical issues embedded in the studies and conclude that
the extant studies do not provide significant support for either the claim that
higher rates deter, or that lower rates spur, entrepreneurship. Like
Fleischer, but for different reasons, Clingingsmith and Shane advise against
6. Id. at 2460 (quoting Claus Offe, The European Model of “Social” Capitalism: Can
It Survive European Integration?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 437, 447 (2003)).
7. See Victor Fleischer, Job Creationism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2477 (2016).
8. Id. at 2479.
9. Id. at 2485–86.
10. Id. at 2486.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2488.
13. See generally id.
14. Id. at 2489.
15. David Clingingsmith & Scott Shane, How Individual Income Tax Policy Affects
Entrepreneurship, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2495 (2016).
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using tax rates to encourage entrepreneurial activity. Given that the
“population of entrepreneurs whose activities create substantial
employment and productivity growth is small,” they argue that
governments should not use “the blunt instrument of [reducing] individual
income tax rates,” but instead should “address[] this population directly
through targeted policies.”16
Contributors Ajay K. Mehrotra and Julia C. Ott address incursions on
progressivity under the U.S. tax law by exploring “the origins and early
development of our current capital gains tax preference.”17 The primary
purpose of their article is to explain “[h]ow . . . this preference persisted for
nearly one hundred years through numerous permutations of federal
economic policy and countless changes to the federal income tax code.”18
They demonstrate “that the preference is not a timeless or transhistorical
concept, but rather a historically contingent one—a concept that has been
shaped not purely by economic logic, but rather by political compromise
and social experience.”19 Their examination of “particular critical junctures
in the path-dependent development of the [capital gains] preference”
demonstrates “how the preference has endured because of changing
political and social conditions.”20 Mehrotra and Ott also “shed light on
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different
They
guiding principles of [the] American political economy.”21
“challenge the conventional historical wisdom that Keynesian economic
thinking dominated the post-World War II period only to give way to the
emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s and afterward.”22 By providing
evidence “that it is not simply wealthy and elite American taxpayers and
their representatives who have supported this tax law,” they explain the
“provision’s persistence” as resulting not only from “seemingly inexorable
economic reasoning,” but also from “political forces and institutional
inertia.”23 Their work does more than further “our present understanding of
the capital gains tax preference.”24 It also echoes some of the same issues
raised by the other four contributors when it addresses our current structural
conceptions “of risk, wealth, and opportunity.”25 Moreover, Mehrotra and
Ott’s investigation of a specific tax rule in the furtherance of the
symposium’s theme that We Are What We Tax uncovers “bigger questions
about the causes and consequences of epistemic shifts and economic
transformations.”26
16. Id. at 2516.
17. Ajay K. Mehrotra & Julia C. Ott, The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax
Preference, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517, 2522 (2016).
18. Id. at 2520.
19. Id. at 2521.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2522.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2521.
26. Id. at 2523.
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In the United States, at least in more recent decades, even a moderately
high progressive tax system remains a fiercely contested issue and
seemingly beyond reach. For purposes of the theme of this symposium—
We Are What We Tax—all six of these contributors provide strong evidence
that the promotion of economic growth as a justification for low tax rates on
the wealthy corresponds to and reinforces U.S. taxpayers’ perceived
“legitimacy of the established hierarchy.”27 Further, the contributors’
analyses of progressivity versus economic growth raise two other issues:
Has U.S. tax policy diminished the cultural aspiration for economic
equality? If not, can and should economic inequality be checked through
government spending—as opposed to tax—policies?28
II. HOW REALITY GETS TRANSLATED INTO A TAX SYSTEM
Contributor Tsilly Dagan uses the theme of the symposium as an
opportunity to investigate the consequences of a tax system that necessarily
“entails[] comparisons of people and their behavior[,] the assessment of
individual attributes[, as well as] interpersonal interactions and social
institutions[,] and the translation of all of these” into the “systemic
phenomenon” she calls the “currency of taxation.”29 She addresses
identity-related aspects of a measurement of income designed to distinguish
that which encompasses the “domain of tax” and that which “lies beyond its
perimeters.”30 Dagan argues that “[i]n determining what does and does not
count for tax purposes, the currency of taxation takes a stand about who we
are (and who we should be).”31 As she says, it establishes a “‘normative
taxpayer,’ thereby also impacting what we consider normal and what we
consider unique.”32 It also “creates material incentives for certain
resources, behaviors, and relationships, which are constitutive of human
identity and thus actively support[s]” those very aspects of human
identity.33 Even more central to her identity-related concerns is that “the
conversion of reality into the currency of taxation may, in itself, raise
identity-related issues,” because of “the commodifying nature of the
currency of taxation” and “the involvement of the government in the
process.”34 She selects four tax issues to illustrate the currency of taxation
and its effects: (1) the deductibility of “commuting expenses,” which
“spotlights the underlying assumptions regarding ‘normal’ aspects of an
individual’s identity”; (2) the distinction made between “gifts and barters,”
which “draws attention to tax’s role in shaping interpersonal interactions”;
(3) the tax treatment of the “Israeli kibbutz,” which “exemplifies the
interaction between tax and our constitutive communities”; and (4)
27. Maynard Jr., supra note 1, at 2449.
28. See id. at 2451 (arguing that repeal of the estate tax could be used as a “bargaining
chip in broader budget negotiations”).
29. Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2016).
30. Id. at 2538.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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“personal-based international taxation,” which “demonstrates tax’s effect on
the political institutions to which we belong.”35 Through a consideration of
issues relating to deductions (commuting expenses), income inclusion
(gift/barter distinction), incorporated communities (kibbutz), and the reach
of a tax system’s jurisdiction (international taxation), Dagan argues “that
the seemingly technical ways in which tax operates have some crucial
effects on taxpayers’ identities, our communities, and political
institutions.”36 Further, she shows that the “canonical understanding” that
the income tax is “an instrument for achieving the (at times conflicting)
objectives of maximizing social welfare and promoting distributive justice”
ignores the effects that the tax “may have on our personal and collective
identities” and fails to appreciate that the conversion of human actions and
interactions into the currency of taxation “is neither neutral nor technical in
nature; rather, it involves considerable normative choices.”37
Bruce G. Carruthers’s article, written in conjunction with Dagan’s,
considers how public revenue systems can “serve as an instrument of
cultural expression.”38 Unique to this collection of articles, Carruthers
primarily examines sin taxes. His work has a particular saliency to the
symposium’s theme of We Are What We Tax and Dagan’s work because it
investigates taxes that, by their very nature, explicitly reflect a
government’s normative choices. “Just as personal income taxes recognize
and give quantitative measure to various human attributes, resources, and
interactions, excise taxes are also a precise numerical measure to
stigmatized consumption . . . of market-based goods and services.”39 An
excise tax on what government deems undesirable consumption
“can . . . serve as an instrument of cultural expression”40 in that “taxation of
stigmatized activity shares the stigma with the tax revenues, while at the
same time mitigating that stigma because the problematic activity is now
directly and publicly burdened with a tax.”41 Carruthers also considers how
“budgetary earmarks can further mitigate the stigma by ensuring that at
least some sin tax revenues support valuable and praiseworthy public
policies.”42 Carruthers and Dagan both recognize that “[t]hrough its system
of taxation,” a government “renders the private economy legible[] [and]
recognizes some of its moral features.”43
Contributor Sloan Speck, in his examination of the tax classification of
business entities, confronts the difficulties a tax system faces when
translating the legal, financial, and social realities of various forms of

35. Id. at 2539.
36. Id.
37. Id.; id. at 2546, 2545.
38. Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and Fiscal
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2569 (2016).
39. Id. at 2571.
40. Id. at 2569.
41. Id. at 2574.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2579.
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business entities into an income tax system.44 Taking into account changes
in law, financial markets, business practices, and globalization, he
challenges commentators and the U.S. Department of the Treasury for their
reliance on “efficiency considerations” as the “guiding principle in
determining an entity’s tax classification.”45 He argues that, “while
important, efficiency considerations should not function as the sole arbiter
of the boundary between corporate and conduit tax treatment.”46 To do so
ignores the fact that “classical corporate taxation is, in many ways, deeply
embedded within a larger network of legal and social meanings.”47
Moreover, the “intuitive appeal” of “efficiency” may “mask significant
empirical uncertainties about behavioral responses, especially if
policymakers possess limited information, have difficulty reversing
inapposite decisions, or face other constraints.”48 For Speck, incongruities
between social understandings and the “correct” policy from an efficiency
perspective signal places where tax law may be “misaligned with other
areas of law.”49 In these instances, Speck advocates consideration of
“social understandings” as “a way to resolve policy questions . . . where
economic factors, such as incidence or net efficiency consequences, are
uncertain or unclear.”50
Whereas conventional tax analysis concerns itself with how much or how
little a tax system or set of tax rules might affect economic activity, these
three articles demonstrate the limitations of so narrow an approach to tax
policy matters. The contributors make clear that the translation of reality
into an operational tax creates, changes, and distorts that reality. They also
put policymakers on notice to appreciate that technical components of a tax
system, regardless of the nature of that tax, inevitably implicate normative
choices and social understandings.
III. HOW TAX EXPENDITURES REALIGN
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
A governmental body can accomplish its policy goals by appropriating
funds directly to those in the private sector. Alternatively, it can
accomplish those same goals by providing tax relief to private persons or
entities. This tax relief is conventionally referred to as a tax expenditure to
denote that it operates as the equivalent of a direct governmental subsidy.51
44. Sloan G. Speck, The Social Boundaries of Corporate Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
2583 (2016).
45. Id. at 2584.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2584–85.
49. Id. at 2596.
50. Id.
51. In the context of the U.S. federal income tax, Stanley S. Surrey introduced the idea
of tax expenditure analysis in 1967. See Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Income Tax
System—The Need for Full Accounting, in TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: 1961‒1969, at
575, 575‒85 (William F. Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds., 1973). For further elaboration of
tax expenditures by Surrey, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973);
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). For examples of
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Contributors Linda Sugin52 and Rob Atkinson,53 in their discussion of the
U.S. tax law’s treatment of charities and donations to them, move well
beyond the efficiency-type criticisms typically lodged against tax
expenditures. Contributors Lisa Philipps,54 in her discussion of the
Canadian law’s tax incentives for personal saving, and Martha T.
McCluskey,55 in her discussion of state tax incentives to business, do the
same. Presupposing We Are What We Tax, all four of these contributors
unmask the power of tax expenditures to realign the functions of the public
and private sectors. They further show how the realignment serves the
wealthy, threatens the security of the less wealthy, and produces class
identities.
Sugin, as she pays close attention to the rhetoric surrounding the law of
charity—including U.S. tax treatment of charities—rejects and then
reformulates traditional understandings of charitable institutions, charitable
donations, and the related tax exemptions and deductions. Relying on case
law, legislative history going back to England’s Statute of Charitable Uses,
and current tax approaches, she shows how the legal discourse focuses on
the public nature, public interest, and public functions that the contributions
support and the organizations serve.56 Sugin challenges this public
construction of the tax law of charity. She identifies how the tax law
affirms the “private creation, private governance, and private funding of
exempt organizations.”57 She further demonstrates how the tax law of
charity rejects a notion of tax in which “individuals are not entitled to their
entire pre-tax income because part of that income is the return to social
cooperation that must be shared with others.”58 Instead, she persuasively
argues that the tax law embraces the “appropriation conception” of the
income tax in which “individuals are [morally] entitled to their pre-tax
income and that society has no presumptive right to any part of it, despite
its essential role in the creation of all income.”59 She uses a number of
examples to support this aspect of her thesis, such as generous tax benefits
more recent considerations of tax expenditure analysis primarily focusing on the U.S. federal
income tax, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the
Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
52. See Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2607 (2016).
53. See Rob Atkinson, Liberalism, Philanthropy, and Praxis:
Realigning the
Philanthropy of the Republic and the Social Teaching of the Church, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
2633 (2016).
54. See Lisa Philipps, Registered Savings Plans and the Making of Middle-Class
Canada: Toward a Performative Theory of Tax Policy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677 (2016).
55. See Martha T. McCluskey, Framing Middle-Class Insecurity: Tax and the Ideology
of Unequal Economic Growth, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2699 (2016).
56. Sugin, supra note 52, at 2608 (referring to Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. 4
(Eng.)).
57. Id. at 2614.
58. Id. at 2617.
59. Id.
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for donation of appreciated assets,60 tax deductible donations to foundations
or funds that donors “continue to control,”61 and case law and legislation
designed to “enforce donor’s gift restrictions” and “expectations,” which, in
effect, “treat donors as equivalent to owners.”62
As Sugin emphasizes, “It is not a problem that charity is private. It is a
problem that charity is private and coated with a public rhetoric,” because
the “combination creates a bias against taxation” and the contraction of “the
scope of government.”63 From that understanding of the effect of the
rhetoric surrounding the law of charity, she extends her thesis in two critical
ways. One is to argue that “[a]nyone who turns to charity for distribution
cannot really be committed to distributive justice because the law of
charity—which is fundamentally private—is not designed to make charities
effective in distributing.”64 This part of her analysis relies on John Rawls’s
theory of justice to maintain that “[j]ust distribution is possible, but only if
government is willing to use the coercive power of taxation to address
inequality.”65 The second is to put forward a framework for how to
determine the proper sphere for charitable institutions. Starting from the
perspective that it is “better to ask what government is not suited to do,” she
embraces a role for charity to “challenge and check government” and
support “[m]ovements for social change, the arts, and religion.”66 She
reasons that once “government fully funds its responsibilities,” the need to
embrace the “rhetoric of publicness” vanishes and the “disparate values and
goals” of private institutions can thrive without the government, through the
tax law and otherwise, imposing an unwarranted level of scrutiny.67
Atkinson, who looks to a broad range of philosophers—including, but
not limited to, Ayn Rand, Thomas Aquinas, and John Stuart Mill—further
examines the question raised by Sugin concerning “the liberal state’s proper
philanthropic role” and its justified place in our legal and fiscal systems.68
He shows how philanthropy simultaneously includes both private and
public aspects: “[P]hilanthropy is the work not only of private parties,
alone and in private philanthropic organizations, but also of an activist state,
a philanthropic republic.”69 He sees philanthropy as resolving the tension
between too much state control and too little state control and serving as
common ground to holders of moral views across the political spectrum.70
While he acknowledges a distrust of democracy, he concludes that “it is
better for the work of philanthropy to be done by the state than for that

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2618.
Id. at 2619.
Id.
Id. at 2620.
Id. at 2620–21.
Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2627.
Id. at 2627–28.
Atkinson, supra note 53, at 2633.
Id. at 2637 (citations omitted).
See generally id.
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work to be left undone.”71 Atkinson extends the symposium’s theme of We
Are What We Tax by setting out the “distinct economic functions of the
modern liberal state,”72 grounding “an ethics of philanthropy . . . in both the
Western Classics and the Abrahamist Scriptures,” showing how “this ethic
can accommodate both religiously respectful agnostics . . . and morally
rational theists,”73 and establishing a framework to determine how
philanthropic we as philanthropists “want our liberal state to be.”74 His
liberal state offers opportunity and guarantees individual freedom,
accommodating philanthropy in the process.75 Atkinson’s consideration of
philanthropy, through an examination of the proper role of the state,
enhances the force of Sugin’s thesis at the same time that it enriches the
distributive justice questions raised throughout this symposium.
Philipps and McCluskey also address distributive justice and the proper
allocation of responsibilities between the state and private actors. Looking
at two quite different types of tax incentives in two quite different
jurisdictions, they both conclude that tax policies have shifted economic
risk from the state to the working and middle classes, leaving them more
financially insecure with insufficient recourse to their government for relief.
Both contributors demonstrate the inadequacy, ineffectiveness, and
incompleteness of the government’s policy responses to economic
insecurity and inequality. Both also interrogate how these responses
negatively affect the identities of members of the working and middle
classes and lower their expectations for financial security for themselves
and their families.
Philipps’s study of the “rise of tax incentives for saving as a prominent
feature of Canadian personal tax policy over the two decades from 1995 to
2015” demonstrates that the “presentation, design, and language of [what
are referred to as] registered savings plans have shaped the content of
middle-class identity, including the behaviors, expectations, and aspirations
that condition membership in this identity group.”76 Her approach, which
builds on Judith Butler’s performative theory of gender, treats tax policy
“as actively producing rather than simply reflecting preexisting
understandings of the middle class.”77 After outlining the influence of
“consumption tax theory, fiscal federalism, and neoliberalism,” in the
creation and expansion of tax-preferred registered savings plans, Philipps
raises serious questions about the effectiveness of these tax expenditure
provisions, highlighting the lack of evidence that household savings have
increased or that economic insecurity has decreased.78 Her point, though, is
not only that the tax rules reflect bad public policy as government no longer
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 2673.
Id. at 2641.
Id.
Id. at 2664.
See id. at 2633.
Philipps, supra note 54, at 2677–78.
Id. at 2678. With regard to her reliance on Judith Butler, see as an example JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2006).
78. Philipps, supra note 54, at 2685.
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takes responsibility for “leveling the playing field” and instead plays the
role of “an investment partner who gets involved only in proportion to the
private initiative of individual savers.”79 Her analysis goes further to show
how the registered savings plans “present an image of middle-class
individuals exercising choice and agency, achieving financial goals through
rational planning and self-discipline.”80 As Philipps writes, the expectation
of rewards in the “future enables tax law to posit an aspirational middleclass subject as an ideal that might not be experienced in the present but is
always in the process of being realized.”81 She acknowledges that the
registered savings plans have garnered “widespread acceptance.”82 She
argues, however, that their popularity “is due in part . . . to the normative
ideal of middle-class identity that [the registered savings plans] have helped
to produce—one based on choice, agency, and the promise of future social
mobility for oneself or one’s children through self-discipline and selfmanagement.”83 To have one of these registered savings plans confers “a
form of cultural recognition that [goes] beyond its capacity to meet material
needs.”84 She concludes that these plans are likely to remain part of the
Canadian tax law “not because they actually deliver the benefits they
promise to most people but rather because they have been assimilated into
Canadian middle-class identity.”85
McCluskey addresses some of the same issues raised by Philipps in her
examination of the resources state and local governments accord private
businesses. McCluskey observes that governmental jurisdictions have
redirected their “support away from ordinary workers, families, and
consumers toward protecting concentrated private market wealth as the
primary engine of economic prosperity.”86 She further contends that
current policies, including tax policies, make the economic well-being of
the middle class dependent “not on hard-earned private rights to personal
resources or public rights to social citizenship, but rather on discretionary,
trickle-down spillovers from superior economic players.”87 She describes a
“neoliberal vision that embraces government support as a foundation of
economic success, but insists that success depends on redirecting
government support away from ordinary workers, families, and consumers
toward protecting concentrated private market wealth.”88 To support her
arguments, she draws attention to an array of state and local policies aimed
at providing a favorable business climate. Acknowledging the political and
economic pressures on localities to offer these tax giveaways,89 she
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 2690.
Id. at 2686.
Id. at 2687.
Id. at 2697.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2698.
McCluskey, supra note 55, at 2700.
Id. at 2708.
Id. at 2700.
See id. at 2711.

2424

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

assembles substantial data to show that large multinational corporations,
rather than local firms owned and operated by middle-class entrepreneurs,
enjoy a substantial share of the tax subsidies. She also explains that the
middle class, even with the hope of employment, however long or short
lasting, ends up paying for “corporate welfare” through higher taxes,
reduced public spending, and reductions in public employment—including
layoffs and reductions in employee pensions and health insurance
benefits.90
In her last example of governmental jurisdictions shifting resources away
from the middle class and toward private capital, McCluskey reveals the
depth and breadth of the incursions on the middle class’s economic
security. She describes a tax incentive program, launched in 2013 in New
York, “making the state’s public higher education institutions ‘tax-free
development zones.’”91 The program includes a ten-year exemption from
many different state taxes, such as business taxes and local commuter taxes.
For five years, it even exempts from state taxation the “personal income of
all new employees,” with a less generous exemption extending another five
years.92 As McCluskey starkly explains, the state has decided to leverage
public universities—a public resource central to middle-class
opportunity93—in its efforts to attract qualifying “high-tech businesses and
start-ups.”94 She views this form of subsidy to private business as risky,
because it raises the very real potential that market and political pressures
will compromise academic freedom and independence. As important, the
example she uses raises a warning about the incremental, and apparently
unchecked, growth of tax expenditures for the benefit of private capital.
Not only do the tax expenditures constrain government’s ability to provide
public goods, they also effectively can facilitate private enterprise’s capture
of existing public resources. McCluskey’s analysis of local and state tax
policies leads her to conclude that “we need a different tax story that makes
public support for the economic and social well-being of the vast majority
of citizens the benchmark for reasonable and responsible tax policy, not a
presumptively unproductive ‘distortion.’”95
Even as they embrace dissimilar methodologies across diverse subjects,
each of these four contributors provides important insights into the
appropriate allocation of responsibilities, as between public and private
spheres, for the well-being of the polity. The contributors examine, in
distinctive ways, how tax expenditures have introduced instability in the
distinctions between public and private goods, public and private action,
and public and private ownership. They also show that the instability of the
public/private dyad in turn exacerbates economic inequality. As the
contributors challenge the privatization of public resources and
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responsibilities, they persuasively demonstrate that governmental
jurisdictions have inexorably relied on the rhetoric of the public good to
adopt tax policies that disproportionately benefit the moneyed classes.
Philipps and McCluskey additionally show that tax policies produce
working-class and middle-class identities that enhance the interests of the
wealthy.
IV. HOW A SELF-ASSESSMENT TAX SYSTEM
HAS PRODUCED A CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The contribution to the symposium by John S. Dzienkowski and Robert
J. Peroni shifts focus away from the substantive aspects of tax systems and
instead focuses on the practical operation of the tax law.96 Their conviction
that “[t]he United States faces a tax-avoidance crisis that seriously
undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the federal income tax
system” prompts their rigorous examination of the historical and current
role of tax advisers, particularly the role of tax attorneys.97 In keeping with
the symposium’s theme of We Are What We Tax, their analysis establishes
the significant negative impact the administration of the U.S. federal
income tax has had on legal ethics and the legal profession itself.
They demonstrate that early debates were dominated by tax practitioners
and scholars who approached the role of the tax adviser philosophically
with a focus on the “voluntary, self-assessment tax system that was enacted
through democratic processes and that presumably reflects the democratic
values of American society.”98 Dzienkowski and Peroni further explain
that the “Cold War environment” and the recognition of the “need for the
United States to be prepared for another major armed conflict” placed a
check on the introduction of “parochial concerns of the legal profession” as
tax practitioners addressed ethical standards.99 Dzienkowski and Peroni
recognize that the tax bar likely had an interest in elevating its “status” and
“reducing the influence of litigators” in the “development of legal ethics
codes.”100 Nevertheless, among the various legal specialties, such as tax,
banking, and securities—all of which developed in tandem with the growth
of the regulatory state before and after World War II—they note that a
“significant segment of [tax] professionals” were among the first to argue
that “they owed duties to the system . . . as well as to their clients.”101
Over the years the American Bar Association (ABA) issued ethics
opinions tightening the standards regarding tax advice provided to a client,
and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Congress
federalized the regulation of professional conduct, including providing for
penalties and a tax return disclosure system. As Dzienkowski and Peroni
96. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Tax Adviser
Professionalism in American Society, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721 (2016).
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explain, these efforts were not sufficient to avoid “two major waves of tax
shelter abuses”—one that “began in the 1960s . . . and lasted until the mid1980s” and the other that “began in the late 1990s and continued into the
2000s.”102 With their description of the most recent wave of tax shelters,
they demonstrate the dramatic change in tax lawyers’ professionalism.
According to Dzienkowski and Peroni, this change can be attributed to
“[s]tructural changes in the practices of professionals in the modern global
economy,” exemplified by accounting firms’ failed efforts in the 1990s,
thanks to the ABA, to provide multidisciplinary services in the United
States.103 Notwithstanding the general limitation on providing legal
services to their clients, accounting firms could expand into and compete
with attorneys in the tax area, because decades earlier the Treasury and IRS
had authorized accountants to provide tax advice. Dzienkowski and Peroni
also cite other aspects of the market pressures facing tax practitioners. In
particular, they describe the economic stress on various departments in
large law firms to produce revenue in the face of the Great Recession of the
mid-2000s and the decision of many corporations to reduce their reliance on
expensive outside counsel through expansions of their own legal
departments.104 Finally, in contrast to cultural attitudes and influences in
other countries, Dzienkowski and Peroni look not only to the tax abusive
conduct of the tax bar, corporations, and wealthy taxpayers, but also to
Watergate and ensuing political scandals, unpopular wars, and partisan
attacks on the tax system and the IRS. They conclude that over time the
social norms necessary to sustain the U.S. self-assessment tax system have
been undermined severely.105
Dzienkowski and Peroni show that the forces leading to significant and
substantial tax evasion have to do as much with the fraying of social norms
as they do with the internal operation and administration of a tax system.
They propose reform measures to counteract the economic stresses and
incentives leading tax advisers to engage in aggressive tax avoidance
activity. Of course, even Dzienkowski and Peroni would agree that a rife of
other big and small changes in civil society is necessary before the hostility
toward government, government regulation, and taxes subsides and the
crisis in the professional conduct of tax advisers abates.
CONCLUSION
The contributors, through a range of specific topics, investigate how tax
laws propagate a constrained understanding of ownership and productivity
and establish class identities along a dignity spectrum in which those with
accumulated wealth are deemed more worthy than others. They also
challenge the conventional distinctions between labor and capital,
individuals and community, and public and private. This foreword
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 2729, 2730.
Id. at 2731.
Id. at 2732.
See id. at 2753.

2016]

FOREWORD: WE ARE WHAT WE TAX

2427

highlights and underscores the impact and import of their work. Our hope,
as organizers, is that this symposium, especially in light of the contributors’
rich analyses, will stimulate studies of other income tax issues, such as the
doctrine of realization; treatment of debt; tax accounting, especially the
coordination of income and expenditures to earn that income; and the
distinction between business and personal taxation. We would add to that
list the issue of valuation, which plays an outsized role in a number of
different tax systems, including income taxes, wealth transfer taxes, and
property taxes. The work of the contributors, with their innovative and
creative approaches to the theme of We Are What We Tax, has provided a
strong foundation on which to build this new area of inquiry.

